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A SOUR LEMON?: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF LEMON
LAW REGULATIONS OF INFORMAL
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISMS
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. Abrams1
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption of state "lemon laws" is a relatively recent
development in the battle between federal and state law for control of
regulation in the consumer protection area. Although preemption is the key
issue upon which Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. Abrams2 was
decided, the outcome affects the continued viability of manufacturers to
establish workable settlement mechanisms to handle the resolution of
disputes with consumers. The court, in holding the New York "Lemon
Law"3 preempted by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act4, determined that the
federal policy of encouraging manufacturers to voluntarily establish dispute
resolution mechanisms outweighed New York's efforts to extend more
protection to consumers.' In the court's opinion, the more stringent
requirements established by the New York statute would frustrate this
federal policy and hence, the statute was preempted.*
1. 697 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2. Id
3. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 198-a (McKinney 1988).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982).
5. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 732-37.
6. Id at 737-43.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Scheme
In the 1960's and 1970's Congress became concerned with increasing
consumer protections in the marketplace.7 Consumers were worried about
the quality and durability of many mass-produced items that flooded the
market.8 Moreover, there was increased confusion and dissatisfaction with
the extent of manufacturers' warranties. To meet these concerns, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act9
(Magnuson-Moss Act) was enacted by Congress in 1975. This Act was to
serve several purposes: to make manufacturers' written warranties more
understandable to consumers (through the establishment of designation and
disclosure requirements); to define content standards for "full" warranties;
and to create remedies for breach of warranty.10 In sum, the purpose of the
Magnuson-Moss Act was to assure minimum warranty protection for
consumers while assuring warranty performance on the part of manufactur-
ers.
11
In order to better carry out these purposes, Congress established
guidelines for the use of informal dispute settlement procedures between
manufacturers and consumers. The policy behind the use of these
procedures was "[t]o encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby
7. In H.R. REP. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 24,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7702, 7706, the House Committee stated:
Paralleling the growth of acquisition of consumer products has been a growing concern of
the American consumer with the quality and durability of many of these products.
Another growing source of resentment has been the inability to get many of those products
properly repaired and the developing awareness that the paper with the filigree border
bearing the bold caption "Warranty" or "Guarantee" was often of no greater worth than
the paper it was printed on. Indeed, in many cases where a warranty or guarantee was
ostensibly given the old saying applied "The bold print giveth and the fine print taketh
away." For the paper operated to take away from the consumer the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness arising by operation of law leaving little in its stead.
8. Id
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982).
10. See H.R. REP. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADM1N. NEWS 7702, 7711; Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192,
1204 (5th Cir. 1985).
11. See Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (5th Cir. 1984); H.R.
REP. 93-1107, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 22, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 7702 states:
The purpose of this legislation is (1) to make warranties on consumer products more
readily understood and enforceable, (2) to provide the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
with means of better protecting consumers .... (emphasis added).
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1989, Iss.  [1989], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1989/iss/12
1989] LEMON LAW REGULATIONS
consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal
dispute settlement mechanisms."*2 Section 2310 of the Magnison-Moss Act
authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to establish procedures to
implement this policy. 13 The law provides that if the informal dispute
settlement mechanism established by the manufacturer complies with the
minimum requirements set out in section 2310, the manufacturer can require
the consumer to resort to this mechanism before seeking relief in a civil
suit.4
The Magnuson-Moss Act marked the first time that Congress had
entered into the area of consumer protection warranty law. This was an
area that the states had traditionally regulated both through the common
law and the Uniform Commercial Code."5
B. The State Scheme
In 1982, Connecticut enacted the first state "lemon law" because of
unsatisfactory protection for purchasers of new motor vehicles under then
existing warranty law." Since that time, the majority of states have enacted
similar statutes to protect this class of consumers. 7 New York originally
enacted its "Lemon Law" in 1983.18
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).
13. Id at § 2310(a)(2). This section reads:
The Commission shall prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal
dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty
to which any provision of this chapter applies. Such rules shall provide for participation
in such procedure by independent or governmental entities.
14. Id at § 2310(a)(3). The relevant portion of this subsection reads:
One or more warrantors may establish an informal dispute settlement procedure which
meets the requirements of the Commission's rules under paragraph (2). If--
(A) a warrantor establishes such a procedure,
(B) such procedure, and its implementation, meets the requirements of
such rules, and
(C) he incorporates in a written warranty a requirement that the consumer
resort to such procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under this
section respecting such warranty,
then (i) the consumer may not commence a civil action (other than a class action)
under subsection (d) of this section unless he initially resorts to such procedure.
15. See H.R. REP. 93-1107, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 7706; Chrysler Corp., 755 F.2d at 1205.
16. Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of State Motor Vehicle Warranty Legislation
(Lemon Laws), 51 AL.R.4th 872, 877 (1987).
17. Id at 877.
18. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1983).
3
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Generally, lemon laws provide a statutory warranty which compels the
manufacturer either to give purchasers a refund or to replace the vehicle if
the vehicle fails to conform with the manufacturer's express warranty after
a reasonable number of repair attempts, and if the defects substantially
impair the value or use of the vehicle.1 9 Many of these lemon laws, like the
New York law, further require that owners of covered vehicles submit to
manufacturer-sponsored informal dispute resolution mechanisms before
seeking the remedy provided by the statute.20
III. THE STANDARD FOR PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that
when there is an actual conflict between state and federal law, federal law
prevails." Hence, the clearest case for preemption is where there are actual,
specific conflicts between the federal and state law or regulations.' Such
conflict would be found if it were impossible to comply with both state and
federal laws,' or if the existence of the state law is destructive to the full
purposes and objectives of the federal law.24 Under these circumstances, a
court must find the state law to be preempted.
The courts have also found preemption by looking to the congressional
intent behind the federal law. If Congress explicitly provided in the
language of the statute for the federal law to be preemptive, then the court
has an easy task in determining that state law is preempted. 2 A court may
also find implied preemption where the federal regulatory scheme is so
19. Annotation, supra note 16, at 877..
20. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 198-a(g) which reads:
If a manufacturer has established an informal dispute settlement mechanism, such
mechanism shall comply in all respects with the provisions of this section and the
provisions of subdivision (c) of this section concerning refunds or replacement shall not
apply to any consumer who has not first resorted to such mechanism.
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Specifically, the clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
22. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), reh'g denied
374 U.S. 858 (1963).
23. Id at 142.43.
24. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
25. See Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 730 (citing California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1987)).
26. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
[Vol. 199
4
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1989, Iss.  [1989], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1989/iss/12
LEMON LAW REGULATIONS
pervasive and comprehensive that there is "no room" for state regulation of
the same subject matter.27
If the area to be regulated by the federal law is one which is traditional-
ly occupied by state regulatory schemes, the court must find clear and
compelling evidence of the intent to preempt.28 The court must "[sltart
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not
to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. "29  Since the consumer protection area is traditionally state-
occupied, clear and compelling evidence is required. 0
State law may also be preempted by the actions of federal regulatory
agencies like the FTC. This is true where the agency has been given
authority and discretion by Congress to regulate the particular area pursuant
to congressional policy. An agency decision which preempts state law will
be upheld unless it is clear that Congress would not have sanctioned
preemption in the particular situation.31 Again, there is not a presumption
of federal preemption, rather there must be either a clear intent that the
federal regulations be preemptive, or a substantial showing that the state law
frustrates the federal policy.
32
In all of these situations, whether the question deals with the preemp-
tive effect by federal statute or federal regulation, the cases are treated
individually upon their facts, applying the general principles set forth above.
It should be further noted that the standard for determining preemption is
rather malleable and requires a great deal of balancing of interests by the
courts.
27. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956), reh'g denie,4 351 U.S. 934 (1956); Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 730.
28. See Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 730.
29. See Id (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
206 (1983)); State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
30. See Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 730; Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New
York, 855 F.2d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 1988).
31. See Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982).
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IV. THE CASE
The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (Association) challenged
several provisions of the New York "Lemon Law"3 3 pertaining to informal
dispute resolution mechanisms. The challenge rested on the contention that
under the Supremacy Clause, 34 such provisions were preempted by the
Magnuson-Moss Act35 and federal regulations' promulgated thereunder.37
The New York Lemon Law was amended in 1986 to include provisions
regulating dispute resolution mechanisms which are voluntarily established
by automobile manufacturers. The Lemon Law does not require the
manufacturer to establish the mechanisms; it only requires that any
mechanism established by the manufacturer to handle consumer disputes
meet certain minimum requirements as a condition to requiring consumer
use.38 The provisions of the Lemon Law that were challenged by the
Association concerned the binding effect of an arbitrator's decision on the
parties,39 the training of an arbitrator,' ° the requirements for recordkeeping,4 1
notice to the consumer,4 compliance with FTC regulations,4 3 and whether
to allow oral hearings and at whose request.'
The court examined extensively the legislative history of the Magnuson-
Moss Act, the history of the FTC regulations, the text of the Act, and the
text of the regulations in reaching its decision that the New York Lemon
Law was preempted.4" The court did not find express preemption, 46 but
rather based its decision on two grounds: first, that Congress had occupied
the field;47 and second, that there were conflicts between state and federal
33. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1983).
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982).
36. See Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1983).
37. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 728.
38. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 198-a(g). See supra note 14 for the full text of this provision.
39. Id at § 198-a(h).
40. Id at § 198-a(m)(1)(i).
41. Id at § 198-a(m)(3).
42. Id at § 198-a(m)(2).
43. Id at § 198-a(m)(1)(ii).
44. Id at § 198-a(m)(1)(i).
45. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 730-40.
46. Id at 732.
47. Id at 732-37.
[Vol. 1989
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law such that the purposes and objectives of Congress would be frustrated
by upholding the state law. 4
V. THE DECISION
A Occupying the Field
The court considered statutory language and FTC regulations in
determining whether Congress occupied the field. The statutory language
examined by the court centered on the meaning of "minimum require-
ments."49 The Magnuson-Moss Act states that the FTC "[s]hall prescribe
rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute
settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written
warranty."1° Attorney General Abrams argued that this section was intended
by Congress to leave open some room for "supplementary state regulation
in this area."51 This argument finds support in the express savings clause
found in section 2311(b) which states, "[n]othing in this chapter shall
invalidate or restrict any right or remedy of any consumer under State law
or any other Federal law."52 This clause would suggest that Congress
contemplated a continued presence by the state in regulating consumer
protection warranties. Furthermore, section 2311 provides for the approval
of state laws which are expressly preempted if the laws give greater
protection to the consumer and do not unduly burden interstate commerce.
53
However, this subsection was not discussed by the court.
The Association's interpretation of the meaning of "minimum require-
ments" was that only the manufacturers were to be free to experiment with
different provisions so long as the minimum requirements were met. 4 The
48. Id at 737-43.
49. Id at 732-33.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (a)(2).
51. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 732.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1).
53. Id at § 2311(c)(2). This subsection states:
If, upon application of an appropriate State agency, the Commission determines (pursuant
to rules issued in accordance with section 2309 of this title) that any requirement of such
State covering any transaction to which this chapter applies (A) affords protection to
consumers greater than the requirements of this chapter and (B) does not unduly burden
interstate commerce, then such State requirement shall be applicable (notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph (1) fthe express preemption clause] of this subsection) to the
extent specified in such determination for so long as the State administers and enforces
effectively any such greater requirement. (emphasis added).
54. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 732.
19891
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Association conceded that the Act did envision a continued presence by the
states in regulating consumer protection, but urged that such was not the
case with respect to the dispute settlement mechanisms.5 The court agreed
and states that it could not have been the intent of Congress to have each
of the fifty states regulating these mechanisms.' Moreover, the court noted
the non-existence of state lemon laws at the time the Magnuson-Moss Act
was passed."s
The court then examined the FTC regulations for guidance as to
whether Congress intended to occupy the field."8 Although the court stated
that it saw no indication of a desire on the part of the FTC or Congress to
"establish total uniformity of the mechanism system throughout the United
States," it nonetheless found that the FTC wanted to preserve existing
nation-wide mechanisms.59 This conclusion seems strange in that it is
unlikely there were any automobile manufacturers who had already
established such dispute settlement mechanisms at the time of the FTC
statement cited by the court."
The court noted that the FTC did invite and consider comment on its
proposed regulations. t In discussing this issue, the court placed strong
emphasis on references to an equilibrium which the FTC strove to find62--
one that kept the "burdens on the manufacturer to a minimum while still
sufficiently protecting the consumer."' Further, the court stated "[ilt would
appear that the Commission did not contemplate the coexistence of
regulation from other sources that would increase the potential discourage-
ment of the mechanisms."' The court found that the comprehensiveness of
the federal regulations spoke of a "clear intent" for them to be "exclusive."65
The court held that "[tlhere is no room in this system for states to tinker
with the federal criteria, possibly discouraging the creation of the mecha-
nisms, and possibly 'outlawing' mechanisms which the federal government
55. Id at 733.
56. Id at 732.
57. Id
58. Id at 732-36.
59. Id at 732.
60. Id Both the State and plaintiff's attorneys agreed there were no lemon laws in
existence at the time the Act was passed. Id
61. Id at 735. The court seems to assume that the solicited comments received by the
FTC reflect the ultimate positions of all those who were to be affected by the regulations,
namely manufacturers and consumers. Id
62. Id at 732.
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has defined to be acceptable."" Therefore, the court preempted the state
law to the extent that it interfered with the balancing of interests undertak-
en by the FTC.
According to the court, the manufacturers have a "federally granted right
to require consumers to utilize that mechanism as a prerequisite to bringing
suit under the Act."67 It is true that complying mechanisms can incorporate
such a requirement into their warranties, but the real issue is what makes
the mechanism a complying one. The ultimate question seems to be: can
the state enhance the protections to the consumer by making more stringent
mechanism requirements before granting the manufacturers this "right"?
B. Specific Conflicts
The court next turned to the question of whether there was an actual,
specific conflict between the state and federal law such that the federal
purposes and objectives were frustrated.' The key point in this analysis was
whether the state lemon law frustrated the congressional policy as it affects
the specific workings of the dispute resolution mechanisms.'
The court found the mandatory oral hearings and binding arbitration
provisions to be in conflict with congressional policy.70 A complying
provision in New York would be non-complying under the federal scheme
because it conflicts with the federal goals and methods of national
mechanisms and increased information to consumers." The court discussed
the other challenged provisions and found them to be in violation of the
federal regulations in part, if not in whole, based on similar reasoning.' In
essence, the court decided that more stringent requirements would
discourage the private mechanisms which Congress said were so necessary
for the fair and expeditious settlement of disputes.73
66. Id at 736.
67. Id at 735.
68. Id at 737.
69. Id
70. Id at 737-40.
71. Id The FTC regulations state that oral presentations will be allowed only if the
warrantor and the consumer agree to them. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(f)(1). The New York law
permits the consumer to make oral presentations upon request. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
198(m)(1)(i). FTC regulations provide that the decision of the mechanism is not binding on
anyone. 16 C.F.R. § 703.2(g). New York law makes them binding on the warrantor if the
consumer so elects, but never binding on the consumer. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(h).
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VI. OTHER COURTS' VIEWS
Only two federal appellate courts have previously addressed the
preemptive effect of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the FTC regulations with
respect to manufacturers' voluntary dispute resolution mechanisms. In
Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission,74 the court was not faced
with precisely the same situation with which the court in Abrams was faced.
The Chrysler case concerned the preemptive effect of the Magnuson-Moss
Act on a state administrative procedure for warranty disputes as an
alternative to the manufacturer's dispute mechanism.75 The case did not
concern regulations affecting a private manufacturer's mechanism.
Based on these facts, the court found no preemption by Magnuson-
Moss Act. 76 It held that there was "[n]o clear statement either in the
express language of section [23110 or in its legislative history of any
intention by Congress to occupy the field of informal settlement mechanisms
for warranty disputes."77 The court did state, however, that "Itihe preclusive
effect of section [23110 is limited to rules governing informal dispute
resolution procedures created by private warrantors and does not affect such
schemes where provided as an option for consumers by state law."' Thus,
it would seem from this last statement that the Fifth Circuit Court
suggested that a state regulatory scheme over private manufacturers'
mechanisms, such as New York's Lemon Law, would be precluded by the
Magnuson-Moss Act. However, Attorney General Abrams in Abrams argued
that since this was not the issue before the Fifth Circuit, it was no more
than dictum. 9
In Wolf v. Ford Motor Co.,' the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a consumer could bring a state common law fraud action to
challenge the operation of the manufacturer's dispute settlement mechanism.
The case did not involve the Virginia Lemon Law. The consumer felt that
Ford's dispute settlement mechanism was not being operated fairly." The
court held the state law preempted and stated that there was a "[c]ongressi-
onal intent to reserve to the federal regulatory body the authority to
74. 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
75. Id at 1195.
76. Id
77. Id at 1205-06.
78. Id at 1206.
79. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 734.
80. 829 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1987).
81. Id at 1278.
[Vol. 1989
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supervise whether the mechanisms are created and operated fairly."' The
court reasoned that to "[pjermit consumers to test the bona fide nature and
validity of private dispute settlement mechanisms... under the law of each
state would frustrate completely the goal of national uniformity painstakingly
designed by federal statute and regulation."8 This is an understandable
conclusion when one looks at section 2310(a)(4) which gives the FTC the
authority to supervise whether dispute settlement mechanisms are complying
or not.8
Two federal district courts have also addressed the preemptive effect of
the Magnuson-Moss Act with respect to dispute resolution mechanisms. In
Automobile Importers of America v. Minnesota,' the court found that the
state lemon law in question was not preempted by federal law.' One of the
challenged provisions of the Minnesota law required that the manufacturer
establish dispute mechanismsY Under the federal law, the manufacturer has
the option of establishing the mechanism.ss
The court reasoned that this case was distinguishable from Wolf,89 in
that this case "concerns the power of a state legislature to attempt to
enhance protections accorded to consumers by federal law."90 Wolf had
involved a common law fraud action by a consumer. Based on its analysis
of the savings and preemption clauses, the court found that there was
congressional intent to preserve some state law on the subject and only a
very narrow class of state laws was preempted.9' The court thus determined
82. I& at 1279.
83. Id at 1280.
84. The full text of § 2310(a)(4) reads:
The Commission [FTC] on its own initiative may, or upon written complaint filed by any
interested person, shall, review the bona fide operation of any dispute settlement procedure
resort to which is stated in a written warranty to be a prerequisite to pursuing a legal
remedy under this section. If the Commission finds that such procedure or its
implementation fails to comply with the requirements of the rules under paragraph (2), the
Commission may take appropriate remedial action under any authority it may have under
this chapter or any other provision of law.
85. 681 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Minn. 1988).
86. IE at 1378-79.
87. MINN. STAT. § 325F.655 (1983).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a).
89. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
90. Automobile Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1378.
91. Id at 1378-79. The express preemption clause is limited to labeling and disclosure in
written warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(c) provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) [savings clause] of this section and in paragraph
(2) of this subsection, a State requirement--
19891
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that Congress had not occupied the field. In considering the "actual
conflict" test of preemption, the Court found none to exist. It reasoned that
the "[o]verriding intent behind Magnuson-Moss appears to have been to
enhance consumer protections."g2 Therefore, it stated that the Minnesota
Lemon Law was not "an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."93 Rather, the lemon law sought to further the congressional
purpose of protecting consumers by enhancing the Magnuson-Moss
protections.' The FTC regulations were only perceived as minimum
requirements which could be enhanced by the state. The court further
noted that Magnuson-Moss was not intended to grant "rights" to manufac-
turers.9
A Kentucky federal district court upheld a challenge to Kentucky's
Lemon Law provisions. In Chrysler Corp. v. Armistrong,96 the court found
that a provision which required manufacturers to hold an oral hearing
unless waived by the consumer was within the savings clause of Magnuson-
Moss because it was a right or remedy granted by state law.9 7 The court
agreed with a non-binding FTC staff opinion which held that the "Act and
its history show no Congressional intent whatsoever to occupy the field of
warranty law, or even to exercise exclusive jurisdiction as to those aspects
of warranty law addressed in the Act."9 Moreover, the FTC staff opinion
stated that "a finding of implied preemption of a state law outside the
narrow realm of express preemption must be based on strong evidence of
a necessary conflict with the federal Act or rule."99
Based on these four prior decisions, it would appear that there is a split
in opinion as to whether the Magnuson-Moss Act should have preemptive
(A) which relates to labeling or disclosure with respect to written warranties or
performance thereunder,
(B) which is within the scope of an applicable requirement of sections 2302
[content], 2303 [designation], and 2304 [minimum standards for warranties] of this
title (and rules implementing such sections), and
(C) which is not identical to a requirement of section 2302, 2303, or 2304 of this
title (or a rule thereunder),
shall not be applicable to written warranties complying with such sections (or rules
thereunder).
92. Automobile Importers, 681 F. Supp. at 1378. See H.R. 93-1107, supra note 5.
93. Armstrong, 681 F. Supp. at 1378.
94. Id
95. Id at 1380.
96. No. 83-45, slip op. (E.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 1985).
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effect on state lemon laws. The court in Abrams considered all of these
prior decisions, and relied as well upon its own perception of the legislative
history and language of the Act and the FTC regulations in its decision.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the court in Abrams placed most of its emphasis
on the interests of the manufacturers when weighing the interests between
the manufacturers and the consumers. It is worth reiterating the overriding
purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Act, i.e., to enhance consumer protection,
and to ask whether the court has lost sight of this ultimate goal. The
burdens to the manufacturers must be considered, but they have greater
resources than the average consumer to bear such burdens. The court
decided that the New York Lemon Law overburdened the manufacturers to
a degree that would be unacceptable in the federal scheme. The court held
that New York General Business Law section 198-a (g), (h), and (m) were
severed from the remainder of the Lemon Law because they were pre-
empted by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and FTC regulations
promulgated thereunder."°
The court was very thorough in its examination of the issues in this case
and succeeded in discussing all of the relevant points of view. However, in
coming down on the side of the manufacturers, the court has severely
limited the ability of New York (and possibly other states if courts there
find the rationale of this court persuasive) to further enhance protections
to consumers in the area of consumer protection warranty law. 01
DAVID P. HIATr
100. Abrams, 697 F. Supp. at 743-44.
101. The state of New York could seek to have those statutes granting greater protection
to consumers approved by the FTC, notwithstanding the court's finding of preemption, pursuant
to section 2311(c)(2) of the Magnuson-Moss Act so long as it can show that interstate
commerce will not be unduly burdened. See supra note 53 for the text of this subsection.
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